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ABSTRACT Virtual bidding provides a mechanism for financial players to participate in wholesale
day-ahead (DA) electricity markets. The price difference between DA and real-time (RT) markets creates
financial arbitrage opportunities for financial players. Physical market participants (MP), referred to as
participants with physical assets in this paper, can also take advantage of virtual bidding but in a different
way, which is to further amplify the value of their physical assets. Therefore, this work proposes a model
for such physical MPs to maximize the profits. This model employs a bi-level optimization approach,
where the upper-level subproblem maximizes the total profit from both physical generations and virtual
transactions while the lower-level model mimics the multi-period network-constrained DA market clearing
process. In this model, uncertainties associated with other MPs as well as RT market prices are considered.
Moreover, the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) metric is utilized to measure the risk of diverse strategies.
The optimal strategy of the strategic physical MP is derived by solving this bi-level optimization model.
The proposed bi-level model is transformed to a single level mixed integer linear programming (MILP)
model using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions and the duality theory. Case studies show
the effectiveness of the proposed method and reveal physical MPs may choose to deploy virtual transactions
in a very different way than pure financial MPs.
INDEX TERMS Bidding strategy, bi-level optimization, financial products, physical market participants,
profit maximization, virtual bidding.
NOMENCULTURE
A. SETS AND INDICES

t
i
v
j
d
k
n
l
s
w
ψn

Time periods
Generating units of strategic producers
Virtual bid
Other generating units of the nonstrategic producer
Demands
Generation/demand offer/bid blocks
Buses
Transmission lines
Scenarios related to other MPs’ behaviors
Scenarios related to RT market prices
Sets of players located at bus n

B. PARAMETERS

λRT
tn
λG
tik

Real Time price at bus n at time t
Marginal cost of strategic unit i at time t

λRtjk

Marginal cost of nonstrategic unit j at time t

λD
tdk
Vtvmax

Marginal utility of demand d at time t
Upper limit of virtual bid v quantity at time t in
DA Market

G

Ptik
R

Ptjk
D
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Ptdk
RU i
RDi

Upper limit generation of strategic unit i at
time t
Upper limit generation of nonstrategic unit j at
time t
Upper limit of demand d at time t
Ramp up limit of generating unit i
Ramp down limit of generating unit i
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PTDF nl

proxytv
B
Cl
β
α
5s
τw

Power Transfer Distribution Factor (sensitivity
of power flows through line l to the injection
power to bus n)
Proxy of virtual transaction v at time t
Proxy Budget
Power flow Capacity of line l
Weighting parameter
Confidence level
Scenario s probability in DA market
Scenario w probability

Note that some of these constants contain index s or w when
they refer to scenario s or w.
C. VARIABLES

γtv
G
γtik

V tv
PRtjk

bid price of virtual bid v at time t
Offer price of generating unit i of the strategic
producer at time t
Virtual bid v power in DA market at time t
Power of generating unit i of the strategic producer in DA market at time t
Offer energy of the virtual bid v at time t
Nonstrategic unit j cleared power at time t

PD
tdk

Cleared power consumed by demand d at time t

LF tl

Line l power flow at time t

λDA
tn
ηsw

DA LMP at bus n and time t
Auxiliary variable for CVaR computation
Value-at-Risk

Vtv
PG
tik

VaR

Note that some of these variables contain index s or w when
they refer to scenario s or w.
D. DUAL VARIABLES

λDA
tf

ρG
tik

System-wide Generation-load equilibrium at
time t
Minimum offer/bid quantity of virtual bid v at
time t
Maximum offer/bid quantity of virtual bid v at
time t
Minimum production of strategic unit i at time t

ρG
tik

Capacity of strategic unit i at time t

ρ Rtjk
ρ Rtjk

Minimum production of nonstrategic unit j at
time t
Capacity of nonstrategic unit j of at time t

ρD
tdk

Minimum power of demand d at time t

ρD
tdk

ϑ tl

Capacity of demand d at time t
Line l capacity in negative direction

ϑ tl

Line l capacity in positive direction

ρ tv
ρ tv

Note that some of these dual variables contain index s when
they refer to scenario s.
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I. INTRODUCTION

From microeconomics market competition perspective, market structure can be classified into two categories: perfect
and imperfect competitions. In perfect competition, there are
a large number of producers and consumers that compete
on a homogeneous product whose price is decided by the
demand and supply forces and no firm can influence the
market price by changing their strategies. On the other hand,
imperfect competition opens up the opportunity for some
market participants (MPs) to influence the market prices
in favor of their own interests [1], [2]. As a major player
in the imperfect electricity market environment, electricity generating companies (GenCos) aim to maximize their
profit by exercising offer strategies in one or multiple markets. In recent years, exploring the best offering strategy for
the physical GenCos in a single or multiple markets has
attracted the attention of many researchers and numerous
methods such as optimization-based, game theory-based, and
agent-based models have been examined under the deregulated electricity market environment [3]. Antonio et al. [4]
described how a price-taker thermal GenCo should design
effective bidding curves, which are based on the profit maximizing self-schedule and price forecast. A binary expansion approach for the price-maker MP’s offer problem has
been presented in [5]–[7] presented the bi-level optimization
method to derive the optimized offers for physical GenCos to
maximize its profit. An optimization-based scheduling for a
building energy management system and bidding strategy of
small-scale residential prosumers are formulated as a stochastic bi-level optimization problem in [8] to minimize the
energy cost and prosumer’s inconveniences in the upper-level
and lower-level, respectively. A non-cooperative game theory
approach to design the best strategy for MPs was reported
in [9]. Offering strategy analysis applying agent-based simulation can be found in [10]. Optimal strategy determination of
a GenCo in three sequential markets has been studied in [11],
in which the GenCo is considered to be the price-taker MP in
the day-ahead (DA) and automatic generation control (AGC)
markets and the price-setter MP in the balancing market.
A multi-stage stochastic model to develop the offering strategy of a generator in the chronological DA and balancing
markets has been reported in [12], while [13] employed the
same method to design an optimal bidding strategy of an
aggregator of prosumers in energy and reserve markets. [14]
applied a two-tier matrix game model to optimize the offering
strategy of MPs in the FTR auction and DA electricity market.
This method reflected the FTR game in the top tier and the
energy game in the bottom tier, which was solved in an
iterative process. An optimal bidding for a microgrid (MG)
incorporated with the flexible ramping product in multiple
markets has been presented in [15], which not only increases
the MG’s revenue, but also improves the dispatch flexibility
in the power system.
In addition to physical assets-backed transactions
in the electricity markets, virtual transactions offer a
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useful tool for more effective market operation and can help
achieve improved convergence between DA and RT market
prices, enhanced market power mitigation and market liquidity [16], [17]. Virtual bidders refer to the market participants,
either purely financial players or conventional participants,
take part in virtual transactions. They place offers/bids into
the DA market without having to supply/consume actual
power in the RT market. Despite the zero net energy in DA
and RT markets, the net payoff is measured in a two-stage
settlement procedure according to the DA and RT markets’
price spread. For example, the cleared virtual generation
(demand) will be paid (charged) at DA market price in
the DA market and charged (paid) at the RT market price
in the RT market. Virtual transactions play an important
role in electricity markets. For instance, designed as decrement bids (DECs) or increment offers (INCs) in Midwest
Independent Transmission System Operator (MISO), virtual
transactions made up around 6% of all transactions in MISO
in 2010 and 2011 [18]. A recent study [19] has explored the
effect of virtual transactions in two-settlement markets with
uncertain generations using four different market models.
A bi-level optimization approach has been used in [20] to find
the best strategy of purely financial MP in the DA market.
A. MOTIVATION

In electricity markets, besides financial players, physical
market participants can also participate in virtual bidding.
However, their optimal strategy can be very different from
purely financial players because of the interdependence with
the physical assets they own. For instance, when the RT
market price is expected to be higher than the DA market
price, virtual DEC should provide a positive virtual profit.
However, it may increase the DA market price which may
cause the reduction of cleared physical generation and therefore the decrease of a physical generation profit. Therefore,
the decision making of physical MP with virtual bidding
capability is a new and challenging problem that needs to be
investigated. To date, there has been little research in this area
reported in the literature.
For a physical MP with virtual bidding capability, the decision making needs to consider the following aspects. First,
the goal is to maximize the total profit which consists of
the physical generation profit and virtual transaction profit,
instead of each part individually. Second, virtual transactions
(either INC or DEC) may affect DA market prices, which may
subsequently alter the profit from the physical generation.
Third, physical generation may also affect DA price and
therefore the DA/RT price difference, resulting in changes in
the virtual transaction profit. Therefore, an optimal bidding
strategy should allow the MP to carefully manage its impact
on DA price so that the total profit is maximized.
The decision making of a physical MP with virtual bidding
capability also faces two major uncertainties: the forecasted
RT market price, and DA market price which is impacted by
not only the virtual bids/offers of the physical MP itself but
also other MPs’ bidding strategy in the DA market.
85394

B. CONTRIBUTION

In order to develop an optimal bidding strategy for physical
MP with virtual bidding capability and at the same time
account for the uncertainties in DA market price and RT
market price forecast, this work proposes a risk-controlled
bi-level optimization model to maximize the total profit for
the appropriate risk level. The upper-level subproblem aims
to maximize the payoff of this market player, whose income is
measured according to the cleared DA market price obtained
at the lower-level subproblem which represents the market
clearing procedure. The outputs of lower-level subproblem
include cleared energy, cleared virtual transactions and the
DA market LMP, are returned to the upper-level subproblem.
Besides, this subproblem incorporates scenario-based uncertainties of rivals’ strategies and RT market prices. Finally,
the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) is used to empirically
estimate the risk of payoff associated with various strategies.
The contribution of this work is summarized as follows:
1) Established mathematical models for a rarely research
yet practical problem, namely, the bidding strategy
problem for physical market participants with virtual
bidding capability.
2) Incorporated uncertainties associated with RT market
prices and with rivals’ offers/bids in the DA market,
as well as conditional value-at-risk to quantity and
control the financial risks associated with the strategies.
3) Revealed the physical MPs may have the incentive to
exercise the virtual bidding capability in a very different way than purely financial MPs.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the bidding strategy problem of a physical MP
with the virtual bidding capability. Section III introduces a
deterministic model and a risk-controlled stochastic model.
Section IV presents a case study for both deterministic and
stochastic conditions. Section V concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
A. BIDDING STRATEGY OF PHYSICAL MP WITH VIRTUAL
BIDDING CAPABILITY

DA market is cleared on an hourly basis the day prior to the
operating day, and the RT market is cleared on a five-minute
basis in the operating day; however, its settlement is performed based on the average of twelve five-minute time
slots [21]. Practically, there is often a gap between DA and RT
prices, hence, a physical MP with virtual bidding capability
can arbitrage the price differences using virtual transactions.
In principal, a physical MP with a considerable market
share can change the DA market LMP and maximize its physical generation’s profits. However, this change may reduce
the DA and RT price differences, which shrinks the virtual
transaction’s payoff opportunity. Thus, in order to optimize
its payoff, the market participant needs to make a compromise
not only between the cleared power and DA market LMP, but
VOLUME 9, 2021
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also between the cleared power and its influence on DA/RT
price spread, and in the meantime, monitor the probable risk
of profit volatility.
B. UNCERTAINTY CHARACTERIZATION

To set its offers/bids, a market participant encounters several
uncertainties, including its rivals’ strategies, and RT market
prices. To deal with these uncertainties, a number of scenarios
are defined to reflect the various realizations of the unknown
variables along with their corresponding probabilities.
Two separate scenario sets are specified for the problem
formulation in this paper:
1) Day-Ahead market scenarios which denote the different
strategies of other generators/demands
2) Real-Time market scenarios which denote the different
RT market price predictions
C. RISK MODELING

Some MPs may not be willing to choose a bidding strategy that may bring high profit volatility, which results
from the aforementioned uncertainty in the problem. Therefore, the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) metric has been
employed, which empowers the market participant to monitor
the risk incorporated with its offers/bids. This metric is linear
and easy to integrate into the optimization problem [22].
D. MODEL DESCRIPTION

In this paper, the optimal bidding strategy of a physical
MP with the virtual bidding capability in the DA market
is formulated by means of a stochastic bi-level optimization model. The upper-level subproblem of the proposed
model illustrates the MP’s payoff maximization problem,
and the evaluation of market clearing procedure under various scenarios, is performed in the lower-level subproblems.
The upper-level and lower-level subproblems are connected
by their respective decision variables. The decision variables of the upper-level subproblem which consist of the
MP’s offers/bids to sell/purchase physical power or virtual
bids in/from the day-ahead electricity market, are transferred to the lower-level subproblem as parameters. The decision variables of the lower-level subproblem include cleared
power sold (purchased) by all generating units (demands),
and wholesale energy prices, which are passed back to the
upper-level problem for MP profit calculation.

the common electricity market practices. It should be
pointed out that these unknown parameters can be estimated and forecasted using publicly available market
data, which is accessible several months after market
clearing [7], [8], [23], [24].
3) The physical MP offers its asset-based physical generation from the location the generators are connected.
Its virtual transactions, however, can be offered at other
locations.
4) Similar to the assumption taken in [2], [3], [5]–[7],
[9], [15], Unit Commitment (UC) is not considered in
this work because its nonconvexity makes the problem
intractable.
In the following subsections, a deterministic bi-level model
of the studied bidding strategy problem is presented first,
assuming no model uncertainties. Then, the model is augmented with the modeling of uncertainties and risk, presented
as a stochastic bi-level model.
B. DETERMINISTIC BI-LEVEL MODEL

The bidding strategy of a physical MP with virtual bidding
capability in the DA market can be formulated using the
bi-level optimization model as follows:
1) UPPER-LEVEL
X
X
X
G
G
λG
λDA
λDA
Minimize
tn Ptik −
tn Vtv
tik Ptik −
G ,PG ,γ ,V
γtik
tik tv tv tik

+

X

t(i∈ψn )k

(1a)

t(v∈ψn )

s.t:
X

PG
(t+1)ik −

X

UP
PG
tik ≤ Ri ,

k
X
X
G
PG
−
P
tik
(t+1)ik
k
k

The main assumptions of the proposed model are outlined
below:
1) Transmission network is modeled using DC power flow
to be consistent with contemporary market practices.
Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) has been
used to calculate the line flows.
2) Other market participants’ offers/bids have been modeled by step-wise curves to be in alignment with
VOLUME 9, 2021

∀t, ∀i

(1b)

∀t, ∀i

(1c)

k

X

≤ RLO
i ,

(1d)

Proxytv Vtv ≤ B,

tv

− Vtvmax ≤ V tv ≤ Vtvmax

(1e)

∀t, ∀v

2) LOWER-LEVEL
(
Vtv , PG
tik ∈ arg

Minimize

X

R
D
Vtv ,PG
tik ,Ptjk ,Ptdk tv

+
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
A. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

t(v∈ψn )

λRT
tn Vtv

X

λRtjk PRtjk

−

γtv Vtv +
X

v

Vtv +

X
ik

PG
tik +

X

PRtjk =

jk

0≤
0≤

tik
D D
λtdk Ptdk

(1f)

G
G
G
PG
tik ≤ Ptik : ρ tik , ρ tik ,
R
R
PRtjk ≤ Ptjk : ρ Rtjk , ρtjk
,
D
D
D
D
Ptdk ≤ Ptdk : ρ tdk , ρtdk ,

X

DA
PD
tdk : λtf ,

∀t

(1g)

dk

− V tv ≤ Vtv ≤ V tv : ρ Vtv , ρ Vtv ,
0≤

G G
γtik
Ptik

tdk

tjk

s.t:
X

X

∀t, ∀v

(1h)

∀t, ∀i, ∀k

(1i)

∀t, ∀j, ∀k

(1j)

∀t, ∀d, ∀k

(1k)
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− Cl ≤

X

PTDF nl 

X

(v∈ψn )

n

X

Vtv +

PG
tik +

(i∈ψn )k

X

PRtjk

(j∈ψn )k


X

−

 ≤ C l : ϑ tl , ϑ tl
PD
tdk

∀t, ∀l

(1l)

(d∈ψn )k
DA
λDA
tn = λtf −

X

PTDF nl ϑ tl − ϑ tl



∀t, ∀n

(1m)

the lower-level linear optimization problem (represented
by (1f) – (1m) by its KKT optimality conditions. The obtained
single-level problem, which is known as mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), is illustrated as
follows.
X
X
X
G
G
λG
λDA
λDA
Minimize
tn Ptik −
tn Vtv
tik Ptik −
G ,PG ,γ ,V
γtik
tik tv tv tik

l

The upper-level subproblem (1a) – (1e) represents the
profit maximization of the physical MP with virtual bidding capability, and the lower-level subproblem (1f) – (1m)
represents the DA market clearing process. Note that the
notations on the right side of the lower-level constraints
represent the dual variables of those constraints. The objective
(1a) consists of four terms: the first two terms
P function
G −P
DA G
( tik λG
P
t(i∈ψn )k λtn Ptik ) represent the negative of
tik tik
profits of actual generation
in the DAP
market and the secP
RT
ond two terms (− t(v∈ψn ) λDA
V
+
tn tv
t(v∈ψn ) λtn Vtv ) are
the negative of profits of virtual transactions which can be
obtained by participating in DA and RT markets. Note that
this paper deals with DA market bidding strategy, and therefore considers the MP to be a price-maker in the DA market
and price taker in the RT market. In other words, the physical
generation of the MP in RT is assumed to follow exactly
the DA schedule, resulting in zero RT profit based on the
two-stage settlement. This is the reason the profit of MP
physical generation in the RT market is not presented in (1).
Furthermore, RT LMP is modeled for the MP’s decision on
virtual bidding. Constraints (1b) and (1c) express the ramp-up
and ramp-down limits of the physical generating units. Constraint (1d) limits the virtual energy offer/bid according to its
virtual proxy which is a financial assurance for submitting
virtual transactions. For determining the proxy, the MP needs
to open an ISO account for its virtual transactions and deposit
some money there to guarantee the capability to pay for the
probable loss [25]. Constraint (1e) imposes power limits that
this MP can trade as virtual transactions in the DA market.
The cleared power Vtv and PG
tik are part of the feasible
region specified by the lower-level subproblem (1f) – (1m).
The objective function (1f) minimizes the negative of the
social welfare. Constraint (1g) represents the generation-load
balance for the whole system, and the dual variable of this
constraint denotes the system-wide DA market price (λDA
tf ).
Constraints (1h) – (1j) define the power limits for virtual
transaction, physical generation of strategic MP and other
nonstrategic generators, respectively. Constraint (1k) represents the demand limits. Transmission line capacity limits are
denoted by constraint (1l). Constraint (1m) represents the DA
market LMP at bus n and time t. Note that (i, j, d, v) ∈ ψn
identifies that these generators/demands are located at bus n
and offers/bids from this bus.
C. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY

To convert the bi-level optimization problem described in
section III.B into a single level problem, we replaced
85396

X

+

t(i∈ψn )k

t(v∈ψn )

λRT
tn Vtv

(2a)

t(v∈ψn )

s.t:
Constraints (1b) − (1e)

(2b)

G
γtik

(2c)

G
G
− λDA
∀t, ∀i ∈ ψn , ∀k
tn + ρ tik − ρ tik = 0,
DA
V
V
γtv − λtn + ρ tv − ρ tv = 0, ∀t, ∀v ∈ ψn
R
R
∀t, ∀j ∈ ψn , ∀k
λRtjk − λDA
tn + ρ tjk − ρ tjk = 0,
D
DA
D
−λD
∀t, ∀d ∈ ψn ,
tdk + λtn + ρ tdk − ρ tdk = 0,

(2d)
(2e)
∀k (2f)

Constraints (1g) − (1m)

(2g)

0 ≤ Vtv + V tv ⊥ρ Vtv ≥ 0,

∀t, ∀v

(2h)

0 ≤ V tv − Vtv ⊥ρ Vtv ≥ 0,

∀t, ∀v

(2i)

G
0 ≤ PG
tik ⊥ρ tik ≥ 0,

0≤
0≤
0≤
0≤
0≤

G
G
Ptik − PG
tik ⊥ρ tik
PRtjk ⊥ρ Rtjk ≥ 0,

(2j)

∀t, ∀i, ∀k
≥ 0,

(2k)

∀t, ∀i, ∀k

(2l)

∀t, ∀j, ∀k

R
Ptjk − PRtjk ⊥ρ Rtjk ≥ 0, ∀t, ∀j, ∀k
D
PD
∀t, ∀d, ∀k
tdk ⊥ρ tdk ≥ 0,
D
D
D
Ptdk − Ptdk ⊥ρ tdk ≥ 0, ∀t, ∀d, ∀k


0 ≤ Cl +

X

PTDF nl 

X

Vtv +

(v∈ψn )

n

X

(2m)
(2n)
(2o)
PG
tik

(i∈ψn )k


+

X

PRtjk −

(j∈ψn )k

X


PD
tdk ⊥ϑ tl ≥ 0

∀t, ∀l

(d∈ψn )k

(2p)

0 ≤ Cl −

X

PTDF nl 

X

Vtv +

(v∈ψn )

n

X

PG
tik

(i∈ψn )k


+

X
(j∈ψn )k

PRtjk −

X


PD
tdk ⊥ϑ tl ≥ 0

∀t, ∀l

(d∈ψn )k

(2q)
Constraints (2c) – (2f) are the set of partial derivatives
of the Lagrangian function of the lower-level subproblem
((1f) – (1l)) regarding to the lower-level decision variables.
Constraints (2g) are the primal equality constraints of the
lower-level subproblem ((1g) – (1m)), and the remaining
constraints are the complementarity constraints [26].
Model (2) is a single-level nonlinear problem, whose nonG
DA
linearity comes from three terms: terms λDA
tn Ptik and λtn Vtv
in the objective function (2a) and the complementarity constraints (2h) – (2q). The nonlinear terms in (2a) can be
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translated to their equivalent linear expressions applying the
strong duality theorem (SDT) [6]. Furthermore, the FortunyAmat Transformation technique [26] is used to replace the
complementarity constraints with their equivalent mixed integer linear terms. Therefore, model (2) is converted to a mixed
integer linear programming (MILP) problem, which can be
handled using available solvers and accessible commercial
software [27].

X

1) UPPER-LEVEL

Maximize (1 − β)

X

1

5s 

X

G
λDA
tns Ptiks

t(i∈ψn )k

s


X

+

λDA
tns Vtvs −

X

t(v∈ψn )

X

G
λG
tik Ptiks −


τw λRT
tnw Vtvs

t(i∈ψn )w

tik

1 X
5s τw ηsw )
+ β(VaR −
1 − α sw−
s.t:
X

PG
(t+1)iks −

X

UP
PG
tiks ≤ Ri ,

(3a)

∀t, ∀i, ∀s

(3b)

∀t, ∀i, ∀s

(3c)

k

k
X
X
G
Ptiks −
PG
(t+1)iks
k
k

X

Proxytv Vtvs ≤ B,

≤ RLO
i ,

(3d)

∀s

tv

(3e)
−Vtvmax ≤ V tv ≤ Vtvmax ∀t, ∀v, ∀s

X
X
X
G
G
λDA
λDA
λG
VaR − 
tns Vtvs −
tns Ptiks +
tik Ptiks
t(v∈ψn )

t(i∈ψn )k

X


λRT
tnw Vtvs ≤ ηsw

(3f)

∀s, ∀w

t(v∈ψn )

ηsw ≥ 0,

(3g)

∀s, ∀w

2) LOWER-LEVEL
(
(Vtvs , PG
tiks ) ∈ arg
+

X
tjk

s.t:
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Minimize

R
D
PG
tiks ,Vtvs ,Ptjks ,Ptdks

λRtjks PRtjks −

X
tdk

X
tv

D
λD
tdks Ptdks

γtv Vtvs +

X

X

PRtjks =

X

DA
PD
tdks : λtfs ,

∀t, ∀s

dk

jk

(3i)
−V tv ≤ Vtvs ≤ V tv :
0≤
0≤

ρ Vtvs , ρ Vtvs ,

G
G
≤ Ptik : ρ G
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In this formulation all variables are 1 = {γtv , Vtvs ,
G , PG , λDA , :ρ V ,ρ V , ρ G , ρ G ,ρ R , ρ R ,
V tv ,VaR, ηsw , γtik
tvs tvs
tiks tfs
tiks
tiks tjks tjks
R ,ρ D , ρ D ,ϑ , ϑ and λDA } and the binary variρ Rtjks , ρtjks
tls
tns
tdks tdks tls
ables created during applying Fortuny-Amat transformation.
The objective function (3a) is the negative of the expected
profit and 5s represents the probability associated with
scenario s. RT market price uncertainty has been represented
in the fourth term of the objective function, in which τw is
the probability of scenarios associated with RT market price
scenarios. The last term of the objective function (3a) is
conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). Weighting parameter β is
used to compromise between the expected profit and CVaR.
The lower β is, the more risk-taker the MP is. However,
risk-averse MP accepts the higher value of β. It means if β is
large enough (close to 1), the MP neglects its expected profit
but guarantees the minimum profit for a given confidence
level α. Constraints (3f) and (3g) are used to compute the
CVaR [22]. All other constraints are similar to the deterministic model, while the lower-level subproblem is solved for
each scenario s. The procedure of constructing the MPEC
and MILP for problem (3) is completely similar to the
deterministic model.
IV. CASE STUDIES

tik


−

PG
tiks +

ik

−C l ≤

Bidding strategy of the intended MP is affected by the uncertainties of other MPs’ offers/bids and the RT market prices.
These uncertainties can be incorporated into the main problem (1) by employing a sets of scenarios, each of which
represents the realization of different uncertain parameters.
In this modeling, the probability distribution functions (PDF)
of all uncertain parameters are assumed to be known or
estimated based on historical information. Adding the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) measure to control the profit risk,
the resulted formulation will be as follows:

X

v

0≤
D. STOCHASTIC BI-LEVEL MODEL WITH UNCERTAINTY
AND RISK MODELING

Vtvs +

G G
γtik
Ptiks

tik

(3h)

The proposed models have been tested on systems of different
sizes, and for different conditions (including uncongested and
congested conditions). For demonstration purpose, two IEEE
standard systems (IEEE 14-bus test system and IEEE 39-bus
test system) have been studied in an uncongested condition.
Detailed data and results are illustrated as follows.
A. DATA

Systems’ data used in this paper such as generation capacities,
maximum load quantities, transmission line capacities, and
etc. have been taken from [28], [29]. Moreover, forecasted
offers/bids prices of generators/loads are obtained from [6],
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and have been slightly modified to match the assumptions
made in this paper.
TABLE 1. Generators data.

For the sake of simplicity, the similar 24-hour bid price profile
is employed for all loads.
Power Transfer distribution Factors (PTDFs) of the IEEE
14-bus test system is obtained from MATPOWER [29]. Forecasted real-time market prices are obtained through simulation and shown in Table 4. It is worth mentioning that the
price forecast is for an uncongested system and the forecast
will change for congested systems.
TABLE 4. Predicted real time market price ($/MWh).

B. 14-BUS TEST SYSTEM

The IEEE 14-bus test system has 14 buses, 5 generators,
11 loads, and 20 transmission lines [28]. Modifications and
additional parameters have been made to the system for better
illustration. The generators’ data is summarized in Table 1.
It is assumed that generators submit two-block offer curves
for each hour. The two-block offer generations are shown by
P1 and P2 , and the corresponding marginal costs are depicted
by λ1 and λ2 . RU/RD represents the generator ramp up and
ramp down rate. We consider that a strategic MP has two
generators G1 and G3 located at buses 1 and 3 with installed
capacities of 182.4 MW and 100 MW, respectively.
TABLE 2. Demand power (MW).

Three different case studies have been designed to test the
Deterministic Model (2) and Stochastic Model (3). Different
conditions, including uncongested and congested systems,
have been tested, and the results for uncongested system are
presented for illustration:
• Case 1: All MPs offer their marginal costs and the
strategic MP does not have virtual bidding capability.
• Case 2: Strategic MP offers strategically without virtual
bidding capability while other MPs offer their marginal
costs.
• Case 3: Strategic MP offers strategically with virtual
bidding capability while other MPs offer their marginal
costs.

TABLE 3. Demand bid price ($/MWh).

C. RESULTS FOR DETERMINISTIC CONDITION
(MODEL (2))

Table 2 and Table 3 display the demand bids and the
corresponding bid prices of the two blocks, respectively.

The total cleared power and total profits of the strategic MP
for the three cases are depicted in Fig. 1. It shows that, in comparison to Case 1, where all MPs, including the strategic
MP put in their marginal costs as offer prices, this strategic
MP makes significantly higher profits in Case 2. In Case 2,
the MP offers a strategically determined higher price so that
the market clearing price is increased, as shown in Fig. 2(a).
Although the cleared power is reduced, the profit increases.
In Case 3, the presence of virtual transactions makes the decision making process more complicated for the strategic MP
since virtual transactions may change the DA market prices
and subsequently alter the DA/RT price which affects the virtual transaction profit, and the changed DA price has a direct
impact on physical generation profit. Therefore, the strategic MP needs to make a compromise between the physical
generation profit and the virtual transaction profit through
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FIGURE 1. Results of the strategic MP in the IEEE 14-bus system. a) Total
cleared power and b) Total profits of MP.

FIGURE 2. Effect of virtual transactions on market price in the IEEE
14-bus system. a) DA market prices for the three cases and the predicted
RT price; b) Virtual transaction in Case 3.

a delicate balance between the amount of physical/virtual
transactions and its impact on DA prices. In comparison to
Case 2, more physical generation power of the strategic MP
is cleared in Case 3, leading to higher profit for the following
reasons:
a) From hour 1 to hour 10, the predicted RT price is
lower than the DA price in Case 2, as illustrated in Fig. 2(a).
For virtual transaction without physical generation, which is
often studied in the literature, the virtual transaction would
always choose to act as a virtual generation (INC) in order to
make virtual transaction profit. For virtual transactions with
physical generation, which is the focus of the work, the MP
may choose a different strategy because virtual generation
can cause a negative impact on the physical generation profit
through its impact on DA prices. In this case study, the strategic MP chooses to bid in as a virtual demand (of 6.3 MW)
instead of virtual generation and manages to keep the DA/RT
price difference unchanged. Although the virtual demand
VOLUME 9, 2021

leads to a negative virtual transaction profit, the strategic
MP’s generation increases as a result of the virtual demand,
and the physical generation profit increases more than the loss
in virtual transaction profit, resulting in an increase of the net
profit.
b) From hour 11 to hour 14, the predicted RT prices
are slightly higher than the DA prices in Case 2 (as seen
in Fig. 2(a)), leaving small room to make virtual transaction profit alone. The strategic MP decides to bid virtual
demand in large quantity which substantially increases the
DA prices. As the DA prices become higher than the RT
prices, it incurs significant loss to the virtual transaction
profit. However, the negative virtual transaction profit is
offset by the much-increased physical generation profit (as
seen in Fig. 3 (a)) that benefits from increased DA prices.
As a result, the total profit has increased.

FIGURE 3. Profit comparison. a) Hourly physical generation profit for
Case 2 and Case 3. b) Hourly virtual transaction profit in Case 3.

c) From hour 15 to hour 24, the predicted RT price is
considerably higher than the DA price (as seen in Fig. 2(a)),
and strategic MP bids in a virtual demand which is expected
to bring virtual transaction profit as long as the resulting DA
price is maintained to be lower than the predicted RT price.
In addition, the virtual demand increases the DA price and
therefore brings higher physical generation profit.
For the above reasons, the strategic MP with virtual bidding
capability (Case 3) achieves a higher total profit than Case 2,
as shown in Fig. 1 (b).
D. RESULTS FOR STOCHASTIC CONDITION (MODEL 3)

Scenario generation methods applied for power system
applications can be classified into three general categories:
sampling-based, forecasting-based and optimization-based
approaches [30]; and different works apply various methods
to generate an appropriate number of scenarios [31], [32].
Since the number of generated scenarios is normally huge
in these methods, scenario reduction methods are applied to
reduce the number of generated scenarios [33]–[35]. For the
sake of illustration in this paper, we generate 15 scenarios
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H. Mehdipourpicha, R. Bo: Optimal Bidding Strategy for Physical MP

to model the other MPs’ behaviors and RT market prices,
however, the proposed method can be applied to a larger
number of scenarios.
In this section, it is assumed that the amount of power
offered/bid by other MPs are known parameters by the strategic MP. Moreover, their unknown offer/bid prices are modeled by multiplying the marginal costs (Table 1) and bid
prices (Table 3 ), respectively, with an uncertainty factor
vector [1, 1.1, 1.3, 0.9, 0.75]. Therefore, five independent scenarios of rivals’ strategies are designated, with the predefined
probabilities of [0.7, 0.05, 0.1, 0.1, 0.05].
Moreover, to model the RT market price uncertainty, three
scenarios (A, B and C) are generated by multiplying the RT
market predicted prices (Table 4 ) with the uncertainty factor
vector of [1, 1.25, 0.8]. The probabilities of these scenarios
are assumed to be 0.8, 0.1, and 0.1, respectively. Due to
the simplicity of illustration in this case study, transmission
constraints were overlooked so that all buses have the same
RT price.

FIGURE 5. Profits of risk-taker MP versus risk-averse MP in different
scenarios. a) risk-taker MP; b) risk-averse MP.

we select a strategic MP that owns 3 physical units and is
able to bid virtual transactions in 4 different locations. The
three generators are located at buses 34, 36 and 39 respectively, while the virtual transactions bid from buses 7, 12,
18 and 23 respectively. The same three cases (namely, Case 1,
Case 2 and Case 3) defined in section IV-A are studied
here. Fig. 6 illustrates that, by applying the Deterministic
Model (2), the strategic MP with the virtual bidding capability
can gain more profit than the other two cases. Changes of
market prices in the three cases are shown in Fig. 7, which
reinforces the observation from the previous section that the
price influence of virtual transactions plays an important role
in the profit maximization of the strategic MP.

FIGURE 4. Efficient frontier of profit vs risk for the IEEE 14-bus test
system.

Considering the confidence level α to be 0.95, the singlelevel model (3) is solved for multiple value of β. Fig. 4 depicts
the efficient frontier and indicates the reduction in the
expected profit as the weighting factor β increases. It means
that the strategic MP expects a higher profit when it takes the
risk-taker position. However, it may experience money losses
in certain situations, such as RT scenario B in conjunction
with DA scenario 5, as shown in Fig. 5(a). On the other
hand, when the strategic MP adopts the risk-averse position,
its expected profit declines, while its tailored optimal strategy assures positive profits in all situations, as illustrated in
Fig. 5(b). In other words, the strategic MP decreases its profit
volatility and its expected profit.
E. 39-BUS TEST SYSTEM

To show the consistency of the results even for the bigger system with more buses, lines and market participants,
the proposed model has been implemented for the 39-bus
test system which data can be found in [29]. In this system,
85400

FIGURE 6. Results of the strategic MP in the IEEE 39-bus system. a) Total
cleared power and b) Total profits of MP.

To consider the uncertainty in other MPs’ offers/bids and
RT market prices, 7 different offer/bids of other MPs with a
probability vector of [0.6 0.025 0.075 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.1] and
4 different scenarios of RT market price with a probability
vector of [0.8 0.075 0.075 0.05] are taken into account to
construct 28 scenarios in this case study. The Stochastic
VOLUME 9, 2021
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bi-level problem into a MILP problem to be solved. Simulation results illustrate the ability of the proposed model to
derive the optimal decisions of the strategic MP. Employing the proposed models, the strategic MP can optimally
determine the amount of physical/virtual transactions and
manage its impact on the DA price, in order to achieve a
balance between the physical generation profit and the virtual
transaction profit. A case study on a deterministic condition
illustrates a few optimal strategies that utilize virtual transaction to influence DA price in a way that benefits the physical generation profit. Case studies for a stochastic condition
demonstrate the proposed method allows the strategic MP to
select a risk level which makes the compromise between the
expected profit across all scenarios and the profit volatility in
those scenarios.
FIGURE 7. Market prices of the IEEE 39-bus system in different cases.
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